Driven by the rising popularity of cloud storage, the costs associated with implementing reliable storage services from a collection of fault-prone servers have recently become an actively studied question. The well-known ABD result shows that an -tolerant register can be emulated using a collection of 2 +1 fault-prone servers each storing a single read-modifywrite object, which is known to be optimal. In this paper we generalize this bound: we investigate the inherent space complexity of emulating reliable multi-writer registers as a function of the type of the base objects exposed by the underlying servers, the number of writers to the emulated register, the number of available servers, and the failure threshold.
INTRODUCTION
Reliable storage emulations seek to construct fault-tolerant shared objects, such as read/write registers, using a collection of base objects hosted on failure-prone servers. Such emulations are core enablers for many modern storage services and applications, including cloud-based online data stores [15, 26, [32] [33] [34] and Storage-as-a-Service offerings [17, 35, 38, 40] .
Most existing storage emulation algorithms are constructed from storage services capable of supporting custom-built readmodify-write (RMW) primitives [3, 5, 16, 19, 19, 22, 23, 31, 36] , and perhaps the most famous one is ABD [5] . This algorithm emulates an -tolerant atomic wait-free register, accessed by an unbounded number of processes (readers and writers), on top of 2 + 1 servers, each of which stores a single RMW object. Since -tolerant register emulation is impossible with less than 2 + 1 servers [8, 30] , the ABD algorithm's space complexity is optimal.
However, support for atomic RMW is not always available: the operations exposed by network-attached disks are typically limited to basic reads and writes, and the interfaces exposed by cloud storage services sometimes augment this with simple conditional update primitives similar to Compareand-Swap (CAS). A natural question that arises is therefore how the ABD results generalize when only weaker primitives (e.g., read/write registers) are available. More specifically, we are interested whether reliable storage emulations are possible with weaker primitives, and if so, what their space complexity is, and in particular, whether it depends on the number of writers and the number of servers.
To answer these questions, we consider a collection of fault-prone servers, each of which stores base objects supporting the given primitives. The failure granularity is servers, meaning that a server crash causes all base objects it stores to crash as well. We study three primitives: read/write register, max-register [4] , and CAS. For each primitive, we are interested in the number of base objects required to emulate an -tolerant register for writers using servers. Table 1 summarizes our results. To strengthen our lower bounds, we prove them under weak liveness and safety guarantees, namely, obstruction freedom and write-sequential safety (WS-Safety). The latter is a weak generalization of Lamport's notion of safety [29] to multi-writer registers, which we define in Section 2. Since atomicity usually requires readers to write, which may induce a dependency on the number of readers, we consider regularity for our upper bound; we define in Section 2 write-sequential regularity (WS-Regularity), which is a weaker form of multi-writer regularity defined in [36] . The lower bound of > 2 of servers required for -tolerant register emulations [8, 30] can be easily generalized for WSSafe obstruction-free emulations. Therefore, we assume that > 2 throughout the paper. Interestingly, even though both read/write registers and max-registers have the lowest consensus number of 1 in Herlihy's hierarchy [24] , we show that they are clearly separated with respect to their power to support a reliable multi-writer register in a space-efficient fashion. On the other hand, no such separation exists between CAS, which has an infinite consensus number, and max-register. As an aside, we note that this separation has implications for the standard shared memory model (without base object failures); for example, it implies that a -writer max-register cannot be implemented from less than read/write registers (proven in Theorem 3.2) closing the gap between the known lower and upper bounds of − 1 [28] and [4] respectively.
Results. Despite the fact that the original ABD emulation [5] assumes a general RMW base object on every server, we observe that the code executed by each server in the multiwriter ABD protocol [23, 31, 36] can be encapsulated into the write-max (for handling update messages) and read-max (for handling read messages) primitives of max-register. Therefore, the upper bound of = 2 + 1 applies to max-registers as well. In Appendix A we show how to emulate a maxregister from a single CAS in a wait-free manner. Thus, the upper bound for max-register also applies to CAS.
Our main technical contribution is a lower bound on the number of read/write registers required to emulate antolerant WS-Safe obstruction-free register for clients using servers. While the ABD [5] space complexity does not depend on the number of writers or the number of servers, we show in Section 3 (Theorem 3.1) that when servers support only read/write registers, the lower bound increases linearly with the number of writers and decreases (up to a certain point) with the number of available servers. In particular, our lower bound implies that at least + + 1 registers are needed regardless of the number of available servers. We exploit asynchrony to construct a write-sequential failure-free run in which each write completes while leaving pending writes on base registers, forcing the next write to use a different set of registers, and so on.
In Section 4, we present a new upper bound construction that closely matches our lower bound (Theorem 4.1). Note that the two bounds are closely aligned, and in particular, coincide in the two important cases of = 2 + 1 and ≥ + + 1 where they are equal to + ( + 1) and + + 1 respectively. An interesting open question is to close the remaining small gap.
Another open question is whether our lower bound is tight for stronger regularity definitions [36] . In the special case of = 2 + 1 servers and writers, a matching upper bound of (2 + 1) registers can be achieved by simply having each server implement a single -writer max-register from base registers [4] . The question of the general case of ≥ 2 + 1 remains open.
In the full paper [14] , we prove the following three additional results implied by an extended variant of our main lower bound construction: (1) a lower bound of registers per server for = 2 + 1 (Theorem 3.4); (2) a lower bound on the number of servers when the maximum number of registers stored on each server is bounded by a known constant (Theorem 3.5); and (3) impossibility of constructing fault-tolerant multi-writer register emulations adaptive to point contention [1, 7] (Theorem 3.6).
Related work. The space complexity of fault-tolerant register emulations has been explored in a number of prior works. Aguilera et al. [2] show that certain types of multi-writer registers cannot be reliably emulated from a fixed number of fault-prone ones if the number of writers is not a priori known. They however, do not provide precise bounds on the number of base registers as a function of the number of writers and servers, and the failure threshold as we do in this paper. The space complexity of reliable register emulations in terms of the amount of data stored on fault-prone RMW servers was studied in [13, 20] , and more recently in [11, 12, 39] . Since we are only interested in the number of stored registers and not their sizes, these results are orthogonal to ours.
Basescu et al. [9] describe several fault-tolerant multi-writer register emulations from a collection of fault-prone read/write data stores. Their algorithms incorporate a garbage-collection mechanism that ensures that the storage cost is adaptive to the write concurrency, provided that the underlying servers can be accessed in a synchronous fashion. Our results show that asynchrony has a profound impact on storage consumption by exhibiting a sequential failure-free run where the number of registers that need to be stored grows linearly with the number of writers.
The proof of our main result (see Lemma 3.7) further extends the adversarial framework of [39] to exploit the notion of register covering (originally due to [10] ) extended to faultprone base registers as in [2] . Covering arguments have been successfully applied to proving numerous space lower bound results in the literature (see [6] for a survey) including the recent tight bounds for obstruction-free consensus [18, 21, 41] .
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Shared Objects
A shared object supports concurrent execution of operations performed by some set, C = { 1, 2, . . . }, of client processes. Each operation has an invocation and response. An object schedule is a sequence of the operation invocations and their responses. An invoked operation is complete in a given schedule if the operation's response is also present in the schedule, and pending otherwise. For a schedule , ( ) denotes the set of all operations that were invoked in , and ( ) (resp., ( )) denotes the subset of ( ) consisting of all the complete (resp., pending) operations. Also, for a set of operations, we use | to denote the subsequence of consisting of all the invocation and responses of the operations in .
An operation precedes an operation ′ in a schedule , denoted ≺ ′ , iff ′ is invoked after responds in . Operations and ′ are concurrent in , if neither one precedes the other. A schedule with no concurrent operations is sequential. Given a schedule , we use | to denote the subsequence of consisting of all the actions executed by the client . The schedule is well-formed if | is sequential for all > 0. In the following, we will only consider well-formed schedules.
The object's sequential specification is a collection of the object's sequential schedules in which all operations are complete. For an object schedule , a linearization of is a sequential schedule consisting of all operations in ( ) along with their responses and a subset of ( ), each of which being assigned a matching response, so that satisfies both the 's operation precedence relation (≺ ) and the object sequential specification.
Consistency conditions specify the shared object behaviour when accessed concurrently by the clients. They are expressed as a set of schedules satisfying a desired property. The basic consistency condition for shared objects of any type is atomicity [25] defined formally as follows: Definition 2.1 (Atomicity). A set of schedules satisfies atomicity if for all schedules ∈ , has a linearization.
Object types
Registers. A read/write register object (or simply a register) supports two operations of the form write( ), ∈ V, and read() returning and ∈ V respectively where V is the register value domain. Its sequential specification consists of all sequential schedules in which every returns the value written by the last preceding or an initial value 0 ∈ V if no such write exists.
A register is multi-writer (MW) (resp., multi-reader (MR)) if it can be written (resp., read) by an unbounded number of clients. A -writer register, or simply, k-register, is a register that can be written by at most > 0 distinct clients. A register is single-writer (SW) (resp., single-reader (SR)) if only one process can write (resp., read) the register. For a register schedule , we write ( ) (resp., ( )) to denote the sets of all write (resp., read) operations invoked in . We say that is write-sequential if no two writes in ( ) are concurrent. Let be a set of register schedules. The following weaker consistency conditions will be considered for registers in addition to atomicity:
Definition 2.3 (Write-Sequential Safety (WS-Safety)). As WS-Regularity, but only required to hold for complete reads that are not concurrent with any writes.
Max-registers.
Given an ordered set of values V, a maxregister [4] supports two operations: write-max( ), ∈ V, that returns , and read-max that returns ∈ V. Its sequential specification consists of all sequential schedules in which every read-max returns the highest value written by a preceding write-max, or an initial value 0 ∈ V if no such write-max exists.
Compare-and-Swap (CAS).
A CAS object supports a single operation C&S( , ′ ), , ′ ∈ V, and returns ′′ ∈ V where V is a value domain. Its sequential specification consists of all sequential schedules in which every C&S( , ′ ) operation returns the current object value (which is initialized to 0), and sets it to ′ if it equals .
System Model
We consider an asynchronous fault-prone shared memory system [27] consisting of a set of shared base objects ℬ = { 1, 2, . . . }. The objects are accessed by a collection of clients in the set
We consider a slight generalization of the model in [27] where the objects are mapped to a set = { 1, 2, . . . } of servers via a function from ℬ to . For ⊆ ℬ, we will write ( ) to denote the image of , i.e., ( ) = { ( ) : ∈ }. Conversely, for ⊆ , we will write −1 ( ) to denote the pre-image of , i.e., −1 ( ) = { : ( ) ∈ }. Note that for all ⊆ ℬ, | ( )| ≤ | |, and conversely, for all ⊆ , | −1 ( )| ≥ | |. Both servers and clients can fail by crashing. A crash of a server causes all objects mapped to that server to instantaneously crash (i.e.,, stop responding to the client invocations)
1 .
Emulation algorithms. We study algorithms emulating a reliable k-register to a set of clients from a collection of fault-prone atomic base objects. Clients interact with the emulated register via high-level read and write operations. To distinguish the high-level emulated reads and writes from low-level base object invocations, we refer to the former as read and write. We say that high-level operations are invoked and return whereas low-level operations are triggered and respond. A high-level operation consists of a series of trigger and respond actions on base objects, starting with the operation's invocation and ending with its return. Since base objects are crash-prone, we assume that the clients can trigger several operations in a row without waiting for the previously triggered operations to respond.
An emulation algorithm defines the behaviour of clients as deterministic state machines where state transitions are associated with actions, such as trigger/response of low-level operations. A configuration is a mapping to states from system components, i.e., clients and base objects. An initial configuration is one where all components are in their initial states.
Runs.
A run of is a (finite or infinite) sequence of alternating configurations and actions, beginning with some initial configuration, such that configuration transitions occur according to . We use the notion of time during a run to refer to the configuration reached after the th action in . A run fragment is a contiguous sub-sequence of a run. A run is write-only if it has no invocations of the high-level read operations. We say that a base object, client, or server is faulty in a run if it crashes at some time in , and correct, otherwise.
Fairness. A run is fair if (1) for every low-level operation triggered by a correct client on a correct base object, there is eventually a matching response, and (2) every correct client gets infinitely many opportunities to both trigger a low-level operation and execute the return actions.
Properties of Emulation Algorithms
Safety The emulation algorithm safety will be expressed in terms of the write-sequential consistency conditions as given by Definitions 2.2 and 2.3. An emulation algorithm satisfies a consistency condition if for all runs of , the subsequence of consisting of the invocations and responses of the high-level read and write operations is a schedule in . Liveness We consider the following liveness conditions that must be satisfied in fair runs of an emulation algorithm. A wait-free object is one that guarantees that every highlevel operation invoked by a correct client eventually returns, regardless of the actions of other clients. An obstruction-free object guarantees that every high-level operation invoked by a correct client that is not concurrent to any other operation by a correct client eventually returns. Fault-Tolerance The emulation algorithm is -tolerant if it remains correct (in the sense of its safety and liveness properties) as long as at most servers crash for a fixed > 0. Complexity measures The resource consumption of an emulation algorithm in a (finite) run is the number of base objects used by in . The resource complexity [27] of is the maximum resource consumption of in all its runs.
LOWER BOUNDS
We characterize the minimum resource complexity of the algorithms implementing an -tolerant obstruction-free WSSafe k-register as a function of the number of available servers. First, it is easy to see that if ≤ 2 , then no such algorithm can exist. This result is implied by an extended statement of Lemma 3.7 (proven in the full paper [14] ), and can also be shown directly by a straightforward application of a partitioning argument as discussed in [8, 30] . For the case > 2 , we prove the following main theorem:
Theorem 3.1. For all > 0, > 0, let be an -tolerant algorithm emulating an obstruction-free WS-Safe k-register using a collection of servers such that ≥ 2 + 1. Then, uses at least
This result implies a new lower bound of registers on the resource complexity of emulating a single (i.e., non-faulttolerant) max-register for writers that tightens the previously known lower bound of − 1 [28] : Theorem 3.2 (Resource Complexity of -writer max-register). For all > 0, any algorithm implementing a wait-free -writer max-register from a collection of wait-free MWMR atomic base registers uses at least base registers.
Proof (sketch).
Observe that an -tolerant obstructionfree WS-Safe k-register emulation can be obtained (using an ABD-style algorithm) from = 2 +1 servers each storing a single max-register object. It therefore, follows that 's resource complexity using max-registers implemented from < registers will be < (2 + 1) contradicting Theorem 3.1.
The detailed proof appears in the full paper [14] .
Since a -writer max-register can be implemented from read/write registers [4] , we have the following Corollary 3.3. wait-free multi-writer atomic registers are necessary and sufficient to implement a wait-free -writer max-register in the standard shared memory model.
The following lower bounds are proven in the full paper [14] : Theorem 3.4. Let = 2 + 1. For all > 0, > 0, every -tolerant algorithm emulating an obstruction-free WS-Safe k-register stores at least registers on each server in .
Theorem 3.5. Let > 0 be an upper bound on the number of registers mapped to each server in (i.e., ∀ ∈ , | −1 ({ })| ≤ ). For all > 0 and > 0, every -tolerant algorithm emulating an obstruction-free WS-Safe k-register from a collection of servers such that > 2 + 1 uses at least ⌈ / ⌉ + + 1 servers (i.e., ≥ ⌈ / ⌉ + + 1). Theorem 3.6. For any > 0, there is no -tolerant algorithm that emulates an WS-Safe obstruction-free k-register with resource complexity adaptive to point contention [1, 7] .
We now present the proof of our main result.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Overview. Our proof exploits the fact that the environment is allowed to prevent a pending low-level write from taking effect for arbitrarily long [2] . As a result, a client executing a high-level write operation cannot reliably store the requested value in a base register that has a pending write as this write may take effect at a later time thus erasing the stored value. At the same time, the client cannot wait for all base registers on which it triggers low-level operations to respond, since up to of them may reside on faulty servers. It therefore must be able to complete a high-level write without waiting for responses from up to registers. Consequently, the next high-level write (by a different client) cannot reliably use these registers (as they might have outstanding low-level writes), and is therefore forced to use additional registers thus causing the total number of registers grow with each subsequent write.
In our main lemma (Lemma 3.7), we formalize this intuition as follows: Starting from a run 0 consisting of an initial configuration, we build a sequence of consecutive extensions 1, . . . , so that is obtained from −1 by having a new client invoke a high-level write of some (not previously used) value. We then let the environment behave in an adversarial fashion (Definition 3.10) by blocking the responses from the writes triggered on at most base registers as well as the prior pending low-level writes. In Lemma 3.13, we show that must terminate without waiting for these responses to arrive. Furthermore, in Lemma 3.14, we show that must invoke low-level writes on at least 2 + 1 base registers (residing on ≥ 2 + 1 different servers) that do not have any prior pending writes. This, combined with Lemma 3.13, implies that by the time completes, there are at least more registers on at least servers with pending writes after completes. Thus, by the time the th high-level write completes, the total number of covered registers is at least (see Lemma 3.7(a)). To obtain a stronger bound, our construction is parameterized by an arbitrary subset of servers such that | | = + 1. We show that the extra storage available on these servers cannot in fact, be utilized by an emulation (see Lemma 3.7(b)) forcing it to use at least registers on the remaining ∖ servers to accommodate the same number of writers. We use this result in the proof of Theorem 3.1, to show that the number of base registers required for the emulation is a function of and .
Detailed proof. For any time (following the th action) in a run of the emulation algorithm we define the following:
• Covering write: Let be a low-level write triggered on a base register at times ≤ . We will refer to as covering at , and to as being covered by at if is pending at .
• ( ) ⊆ C: the set of all clients that have completed a high-level write operation at times ≤ . • ( ) ⊆ ℬ: the set of all base registers being covered by some low-level write at time .
• ( ) ⊆ V: the set of all values written by high-level writes at times ≤ . We first prove the following key lemma:
Lemma 3.7. For all > 0, > 0, let be an -tolerant algorithm that emulates a WS-Safe obstruction-free k-register using a collection of servers storing a collection ℬ of waitfree MWMR atomic registers. Then, for every ⊆ such that | | = + 1, there exist + 1 failure-free runs , 0 ≤ ≤ , of such that (1) 0 is a run consisting of an initial configuration and 0 = 0 steps, and (2) 
is a write-only sequential extension of −1 ending at time > 0 that consists of complete high-level writes of distinct values 1, . . . , by distinct clients 1, . . . , such that:
Fix arbitrary > 0, > 0, and a set of servers such that | | = + 1. We proceed by induction on , 0 ≤ ≤ . Base: Trivially holds for the run 0 of consisting of 0 = 0 steps.
Step: Assume that −1 exists for all ∈ [ − 1]. We show how −1 can be extended up to time > −1 so that the lemma holds for the resulting run . For the remainder of the Lemma 3.7's proof, we will limit our attention to the runs in which every low-level write operation is linearized simultaneously with its respond step. In particular, this implies that no low-level write that is covering some register at a time in will be observed by any low-level reads from as having taken effect until after 's respond event occurs. Formally:
Assumption 1 (Write Linearization). For every extension of −1 and a base object ∈ ℬ, let | be a linearization of | . Then, | does not include any low-level write operations in ( | ), and for any two low-level
Note that the above does not affect generality of our lower bound since the stipulated base register behaviour is allowed by atomicity, and therefore, must be tolerated by every emulation algorithm.
We proceed by introducing the following notation: having a register that responded to a low-level write invoked after −1.
the set of all servers in with at least one register covered by a low-level write invoked after −1 and without registers that have responded to the low-level writes invoked after −1. (7) ( ) ⊆ be the set of all servers such that ( ) = ( ) if | ( )| < | ( )|, and ( ) = ∅, otherwise.
Below we will introduce the adversary , which causes to gradually increase the number of base registers covered after −1 by delaying the respond actions of some of the previously triggered low-level writes. (1) was triggered by a client in ( −1), or (2) was triggered on a base register in −1 ( ( ) ∪ ( )).
We say that a pending low-level write is blocked in an extension of −1 if there exists a time ≥ −1 such that for all ′ > in , ∈ BlockedWrites ( ′ ). The following definition specifies the set of the environment behaviours that are allowed by in all extensions of −1: For a finite extension of −1, we will write ⟨ , ⟩ to denote the set of all extensions of in which the environment behaves like after −1; and we will write ⟨ , , ⟩ to denote the subset of ⟨ , ⟩ consisting of all runs having exactly steps. For ∈ { , , } and a run ∈ ⟨ −1, , ⟩, we say that is stable after if for all ′ ≥ for all extensions ′ ∈ ⟨ , , ′ ⟩, ( ′ ) = ( ). The following lemma asserts several facts implied directly by Definitions 3.8 and 3.10. The proof is very technical and for space limitation appears in the full paper [14] . , ⟩, all of the following holds at time in :
The following corollary follows immediately from the claims 2-3 and 5-8 of Lemma 3.11.
Corollary 3.12. There exists a run ∈ ⟨ −1, ⟩ such that , , and are all stable after .
We first show that −1 can be extended with a complete high-level write of a value ̸ ∈ ( −1) by a client ̸ ∈ { 1, . . . , −1} such that the environment behaves like until returns. Roughly, the reason for this is that guarantees that after −1, would only miss responses from the writes invoked on at most servers (see Claim 1) as well as those that might have been invoked in −1 by other clients { 1, . . . , −1}, which is unaware of. As a result, the involved servers and clients would appear to as faulty after −1, and therefore, to ensure obstruction freedom, it must complete without waiting for the outstanding writes to respond. ( ) = ∅, and hence, by Definition 3.9, no writes on the registers in −1 ( ( )) are blocked. However, since ( ) ̸ = ∅, at least one register in −1 ( ( )) must have an outstanding write. Therefore, by Definition 3.10.3(a), there exists time ′ , and an extension ′ ∈ ⟨ , , ′ ⟩ such that one of the registers on some server ∈ ( ) responds at time ′ . Thus, ∈ ( ′ ), and therefore, ̸ ∈ ( ′ ). Hence, is not stable after . A contradiction to the assumption.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Lemma 3.13: We next show that in order to guarantee safety in the face of the environment behaving like , must trigger a low-level write on at least one non-covered register on each server in a set of 2 + 1 servers.
Lemma 3.14. Consider a run ∈ ⟨ −1, , ⟩ where > −1, consisting of −1 followed by a complete highlevel write invocation = write( ), 
The proof proceeds by applying the partitioning argument to the sets , ∈ [4] , as illustrated in Figure 1 . let ′ be a fair extension of −1 consisting of ′ steps in which −1 is followed by (1) the crash events of all servers in 1 ∪ 4, and (2) the respond steps of all the covering writes in −1 and (and no other steps). Extend ′ with an invocation of a high-level read operation by client ̸ = at time ′ . Since | 1 + 4| ≤ , by obstruction freedom and -tolerance, there exists time > −1 at which returns. Since ′ is write-sequential, by WS-Safety, must return −1. Figure 1 : Construction for the proof of Lemma 3.14.
Next, let
′′ be an extension of consisting of all steps in up to the time followed by (1) the crash events of all servers in the set 1 ∪ 4, and (2) the respond steps of all covering writes in −1 (and no other steps). Let ′′ > be the number of steps in ′′ . By Assumption 1, the values that can be read from the base registers in ( −1) at time ′′ in ′′ are identical to those that can be read at time ′ in ′ . Furthermore, by definitions 3.8.5 and 3.10, low-level writes triggered on registers in −1 ( 2 ∪ 3) do not respond before in . Thus, by Assumption 1, the values that can be read from the base registers in −1 ( 2 ∪ 3) at time ′ in ′ are also the same as those that can be read at time ′′ in ′′ . Thus, all registers in non-faulty servers at time ′ in ′ will appear to the subsequent reads as having the same content as at the time ′′ in ′′ . We now extend ′′ by letting client invoke high-level read at time ′′ . Since ′ is indistinguishable from ′′ to , and has no concurrent high-level operations, we get that returns −1 in ′′ . However, since is the last complete write preceding in ′′ , by WS-Safety, the 's return value must be ̸ = −1. A contradiction.
The following corollary follows immediately from Lemma 3.14, Definitions 3.8.4 and 3.10, and the choice of | | = + 1:
, ⟩ where > −1, consisting of −1 followed by a complete high-level write invocation = write( ), ̸ ∈ ( −1), by client ̸ ∈ ( −1) that returns at time . Then, | ( )| = .
We are now ready to complete the proof of the induction step of Lemma 3.7:
Proof of the induction step (Lemma 3.7). By Lemma 3.13, there exists a run ∈ ⟨ −1, , ⟩, > 
By the induction hypothesis we get that ( ( −1)) ∩ = ∅, and by construction of ′ we get that ( (
We are now ready to prove the main theorem:
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let ⊆ be the set consisting of all servers that store at least ⌈︁ 
⌉︁
. Therefore, since ⊃ and the number of objects stored on a server is an integer, we get that there is at least one server in ∖ that stores at least ⌈︁ −( +1) ⌉︁ base registers. A contradiction.
We get that
by Lemma 3.7, there exists a run ′ of consisting of
Therefore, we get that
UPPER BOUND
In this section we present an -tolerant construction emulating a wait-free WS-Regular k-register for all combinations of values of the parameters > 0, > 0, and where > 2 . Our construction is carefully crafted to deal with the adversarial behaviour (Definition 3.10) that was exploited in the proof of Lemma 3.7 while minimizing the resource complexity. Similarly to multi-writer ABD [23, 31, 37] , our algorithm uses read and write quorums to read from and write to registers. However, since RMW objects are replaced with read/write registers, and covering low-level writes belonging to old writes can overwrite registers at any time, the quorums in our case must have a larger intersection. 
Let
⌊︀ −( +1) ⌋︀ and + + 1, we construct a collection ℛ of = ⌊︀ ⌋︀ disjoint sets 0, . . . , −1, each of which consist of registers, and if / is not an integer, then we add to ℛ another disjoint set of ( − ⌊︀ ⌋︀ ) + + 1 registers. Intuitively, is the maximum number of writers that can be supported by a single set of registers as can be deduced from Lemma 3.7's argument. If divides , then exactly / such sets are needed to accommodate the total of writers. Otherwise, the remaining mod writers are moved to an overflow set . Note that for all ∈ ℛ, 2 + 1 ≤ | | ≤ . Then, we distribute the registers in each set on servers in so that every register in is mapped to a different server (i.e., | ( )| = | |). Figure 2 demonstrates a possible mapping from registers to servers. All in all, we use
The resulting layout is then used to derive the read and write quorums as follows: for every set ∈ ℛ, any subset of of size | | − is a write quorum for all writers such that = ⌊︀ ⌋︀ ; and any subset of registers consisting of all registers mapped to − servers is a read quorum (i.e., the set of the read quorums is { ⊆ ℬ : ∃ ∈ s.t.
The construction pseudocode appears in Algorithm 1. The registers store values in V each of which is associated with a unique timestamp. (Note that since safety is required only in write-sequential runs, we do not need to use client identifiers for breaking ties.) To write a value to the emulated register, a client first accesses a read quorum (via collect() in lines [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] and selects a new timestamp , which is higher than any other timestamp that has been returned. It then proceeds to trigger low-level writes of ⟨ , ⟩ on all registers in such that = ⌊︀ ⌋︀ , so as to ensure that (1) ⟨ , ⟩ is stored in a write quorum (lines 9-12), and (2) no more than registers in are left covered by writes that have been triggered by in the course of either the current or one of the preceding write invocations. The latter is achieved by preventing from triggering a new low-level write on every register that has not yet responded to the previously triggered one (lines 10-11). To read a value, a client simply Algorithm 1 -tolerant k-register emulation from registers for all > 0, > 0, and = | | > 2 .
Types:
= N × V, with selectors and
with selectors tsVal, rdSet, wrSet and coverSet. Base Objects and Servers:
∀ ∈ −1 ( ), ∈ , initially, ⟨0, 0 ⟩. Let ⌊︀ −( +1) ⌋︀ , + + 1, and ⌈︀ ⌉︀ .
, ∅⟩, where = ⌊︀ ⌋︀ .
Code for client , reads all registers in a read quorum, via collect(), and returns the value having the highest timestamp.
Observe that by construction of ℛ, for every set ∈ ℛ, (1) the number of clients mapped to write quorums in is ⌊︀ | |−( +1) ⌋︀ = | |−( +1) , and (2) any write quorum in intersects with any read quorum on at least | | − registers. This, along with the algorithm's guarantee that no more than low-level writes remain pending upon completion of every high-level write, ensures that in a write-sequential run, the latest value written by a high-level write is always available to the subsequent reads. In addition, since the registers in every (read or write) quorum are mapped to exactly − servers, each quorum access is guaranteed to terminate, and thus, the algorithm is wait-free. Thus, we have the following (see [14] for a full proof):
Theorem 4.1. For all > 0, > 0, and > 2 , there exists an -tolerant algorithm emulating a wait-free WSRegular k-register using a collection of servers storing + ⌈︀ ⌉︀ ( + 1) wait-free -writer/multi-reader atomic base registers where = ⌊︀ −( +1) ⌋︀ .
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We studied space complexity of emulating an -tolerant register from fault-prone base objects as a function of the base object type, the number of writers , the number of available servers , and the failure threshold . For the three object types considered, we established a sharp separation (by factor ) between registers and both max-registers and CAS in terms of the number of objects of the respective types required to support the emulation; we showed that no such separation between max-registers and CAS exists. Interestingly, these results shed light on the resource complexity bounds in the standard shared memory model (i.e., without object failures) as evidenced by our proof of a lower bound on the number of registers required for implementing a -writer max-register. Our main technical contribution comprises the lower bound of ⌈︁ emulating an -tolerant -writer register from fault-prone servers storing read/write registers. To strengthen our lower bound, it was proved for emulations satisfying weak liveness and safety properties.
Future directions. First, for some choices of and , our bounds leave a small gap that can be closed. Second, an interesting question that arises is whether our lower bound is tight for stronger properties. In the special case of = 2 + 1 servers, emulation with stronger regularity [36] is possible with (2 + 1) registers (tight to our lower bound). However, the question of the general case ( ≥ 2 +1) remains open. In addition, since atomicity usually requires readers to write, it is interesting to investigate whether the space complexity (assuming read/write registers) in this case also linearly depends on the number of readers.
Our results suggest a new classification of the data types based on space complexity of fault-tolerant emulations built from base objects of these types, which is fundamentally different from those established by [24] and [18] . A promising future direction is to extend this classification with additional types (e.g., multiple assignment), and potentially generalize it into a full-fledged hierarchy of its own.
Another possible direction is to consider the time complexity of the emulations. For example, we showed that although a max-register can be implemented from a single CAS, the time complexity of the implementation is high. An interesting open question is to determine whether this tradeoff is inherent.
